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Abstract
This article discusses the experiences of high-level managers at a South Korean con-
glomerate named ‘Sangdo’ who worked within the corporate group’s head office under
the owner-executive family. These highly credentialled professionals were attracted to
the idea of working directly under or alongside an elite, wealthy corporate dynasty who
both owned the conglomerate and were its top executives. Rather than seeing this as a
site of inherent conflict between the familial and the professional, I describe how the
idea of working alongside and for such elites was enhanced by a ‘dynastic aura’. Through
the concept of dynastic aura, I highlight how, in South Korea, families that own business
groups are objects of public fascination, particularly as indicators of the future of the
economy. In the context of Sangdo, I describe how managers were drawn to the
potential of working with a new generation of Sangdo ownership, who sought to cen-
tralize and systematize expertise within a holding company. I show how this aura fig-
uratively wore off for managers as they came to understand that ownership was just as
entangled in the corporate form – not necessarily above or outside of it – as they were.
The article highlights how certain aspects of kinship (such as dynasties and generational
succession) still animate capitalist labour, even for non-family members. Additionally,
the article calls attention to the way that actors engage with and understand powerful
actors in their own right, going beyond accounts of anthropologists’ own direct
encounters with the powerful.
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Corporations, kinship, management, ownership, South Korea
Anthropological studies of corporate ownership have hewed closely to aspects that
intersect with the field’s most inalienable object: kinship (Hamabata, 1990; Kim,
1992; Lima, 2000, Marcus, 2000; Marcus and Hall, 1992; Sklair, 2018; Yanagisako,
2002).1 Moving beyond tropes of family business as a purely affective or intimate
realm counterposed to a modern, professional management, this oeuvre has
remarked how cultural forces and narratives around kinship ‘incite and shape
capitalist production and capitalist accumulation’ rather than standing outside
of them or being merely affected by them (Yanagisako, 2002: 4). Summarizing
his work on American dynasties, George Marcus (2000: 10) goes further to
describe the ‘deep legacies of dynastic subjectivity’. These cultural legacies
extend into popular culture as well, where ‘the power of the name and identity
. . . can revive family aspirations in ways and locations unexpected’ because such
narratives can lend ‘moral stature to money’ (Marcus, 2000: 27).
Tensions around succession, inheritance and control among consanguineous
family members have lent themselves naturally to many anthropological analyses
and insights, however, if we are to take kinship and other cultural forces and narra-
tives more seriously in their articulation with capitalism, then we must also extend
analysis beyond immediate kin relations, to their impact on other corporate or cap-
italist actors and to organizational forms. These concerns go beyond what we might
imagine as the use of kinship for corporate control; likewise, they should also go
beyond neo-Orientalist tropes which explain patterns of capitalism through super-
ficial recourse to cultural tradition (such as Confucianism in East Asia). Rather, it is
worth understanding what certain kinds of kinship idioms do in animating or shap-
ing capitalist spaces andprojects. For example,AnneliseRiles (2004: 400–1) reported
that Japanese bankers referred metaphorically to the central bank, the Bank of
Japan, as ‘our mother’. According to Riles, private banks and the central bank
had such a close relationship that it was difficult to ethnographically identify the
relationship at all, in much the same way Japanese mothers and sons had unspoken,
intimate relations. In this article, I focus on one dimension where cultural ideas of
kinship and real kin intersect: managers whoworked under dynastic familymembers
in a South Korean conglomerate. I describe how proximity to such dynasties, as
embodiments of corporate power, served as an aspirational site for professional
middle classes to animate otherwise normal corporate work.
Nowhere seems as sharply defined by both dynastic corporate legacies and large
corporate organizational forms as contemporary South Korea. On the one hand,
large industrial conglomerates, qua dynastic entities, have been continuously
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owned and managed by members of singular family lineages, many of whom trace
their origins to the post-Korean War period (1950–53) of drastic economic change
(though some go back further to the Japanese colonial period). Today, male chair-
men, their wives, relatives and descendants comprise most of the list of the wealth-
iest individuals in South Korea, in part by maintaining complex and difficult-to-
trace shareholding ties that grant them degrees of control within such groups. On
the other hand, the conglomerates, qua organizations, employ tens or even hun-
dreds of thousands of employees, are regulated by multiple state agencies, and are
fully imbricated in systems of international finance and global extraction and
production. Brand-name conglomerates like Samsung, Hyundai or SK remain
key objects of public commentary, middle-class employment aspiration, and
urban presence, marked by sprawling glass towers across key districts in Seoul.
Such organizations have been the subject of anthropological consideration before
in ways that foregrounded the new middle-class white-collar workers (Janelli and
Yim, 1993) and historically linked dynasties (Kim, 1992). Janelli and Yim’s work,
set in the 1980s, largely saw the relationship between owners and workers as a
story of hegemony, marked by attempts to control from above, and attempts to
resist or critique from below.2 Today, a new generation of owner-executive (the so-
called samse or third generation) has emerged alongside aspirational professionals
who may share similar goals to modernize aspects of the South Korean corporate
world, differentiate from the past and find meaning in work. While owning families
remain on the landscape, ownership and white-collar workers are both so
entangled in organizational life that it is difficult to separate them into competing
forces. This is captured in the term chaebol – the conventional reference for family-
owned conglomerates – which refers ambiguously either to a unique South Korean
organizational form or the intergenerational families that own and manage them.3
This article is based on fieldwork in one such conglomerate, pseudonymously
named the ‘Sangdo Group’. The Sangdo Group is an industrial conglomerate
involved in metal and steel industries with roughly a dozen subsidiaries and thou-
sands of employees in South Korea and around the world. It is also owned and led
by direct family members descended from the founder, as well as a few of their
spouses. My ethnographic account describes how highly credentialled professio-
nals in the Sangdo holding company (the head office) were attracted to the idea of
working directly for or alongside the elite, wealthy dynastic family who both
owned the conglomerate and worked as its highest-level executives. I foreground
how Sangdo’s dynastic family shaped not only the organizational environment and
historical narrative of the conglomerate, but also intersected with the career aspi-
rations of managers at the top of the conglomerate who contributed to elaborating
managerial projects of the third generation of the ownership.4
To do so, I develop the notion of a ‘dynastic aura’. By dynastic, I refer to named
family lineages that can claim historical status, fame or wealth and who can main-
tain intergenerational succession into the present. By aura, I refer to a cultural
category that is framed as unique, special and rarefied. In contrast to charisma,
which is more narrowly understood as a kind of rhetoric linked to an individual
Prentice 249
person for political purposes (such as coercion), aura signals the ways fame, celeb-
rity or reputation can surround categories of people or things. Auras are as much
enacted, produced or imagined by others as they are an emanation from a person.5
Multi-generational corporate dynasties in South Korea are imbued with a kind of
class-celebrity aura, through their super-elite lifestyles, secretive private lives, and
occasional tabloid stories. They are in many ways diametrically opposed to
quainter notions of ‘family business’.
Members of conglomerate-owning families can possess the highest forms of
social distinction in South Korea: inherited wealth, overseas education, multilin-
gualism, real estate possession, corporate titles, marriage to other business or
political elite families and, in some cases, deep hereditary legacies. For example,
Choong Soon Kim’s ethnography (1992) of the South Korean Poongsan
Corporation describes how the chairman, Ryu Chan-u, linked his company’s mis-
sion to his own lineage, which dated back to a famous 16th-century Korean
(Joseon) official. Such families can also animate internal organizational life, con-
tributing to narratives around corporate history, philanthropy and social contri-
butions, as well as providing a source for management philosophies and corporate
culture. Interactionally, there can literally be a spatial aura created around the
highest figures, such as chairmen, who might be ushered around by personal
assistants or drivers. Those who encounter such exalted figures might halt what-
ever they are doing to hold deep bows as they walk by.
Aura can also capture the sense of being at the edge of generational change, a
temporal motif which often structures ideas about epochal shifts in South Korean
social history. As new generations continue a legacy of their fathers or grand-
fathers and take on key positions, they might also be expected to carve out their
own managerial identities through new initiatives, internal culture reforms, or
business ventures (akin to Yanagisako’s [2000: 90–2] account of the ‘conundrum’
of the second-generation self-made man in Italy). Many of the high-level managers
and other employees in the Sangdo holding company who had joined the company
in their mid-career recounted to me how they joined after being head-hunted by a
newly promoted third-generation owner-executive. This executive had begun a
multi-year effort to grow the holding company and centralize many of Sangdo’s
management processes, from human resources (HR) to legal to strategy, in one
office. One manager, team manager Jang in HR, who had previously worked at a
prestigious multinational conglomerate, told me that he joined Sangdo after per-
sonally speaking with the third-generation owner-executive during his interview
and was inspired by his new vision for the conglomerate and for HR specifically.
Jang even professed to having taken a pay cut to work at Sangdo (a domestic
conglomerate) instead of at a cushier Korean branch of a Western company, where
the pay would be higher but the work simpler. Similarly, team manager Park in
public relations (PR), who had been recruited from another conglomerate, was
able to work directly with the owning family to translate their tastes, vision, values
and history into rebuilding the Sangdo brand; she was also one of the few female
team managers in the male-majority group, another mark of a changing office
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culture. As part of the new vision for Sangdo, managers in specialist areas like
Jang’s and Park’s were deputized to develop and carry out projects that would
centralize, systematize or update managerial processes across the group’s
subsidiaries. Managers would have a wider managerial scope over a conglomerate
through the holding company and proximity to the ownership, who could in
theory break through the complex politics and red tape typical of hierarchical
and bureaucratic organizations because of their higher claims to both the organ-
ization’s identity and financial ownership.
Aura is a useful concept to think with because it can also capture how power or
potency can diminish the closer one gets. Assistant manager Baik on the Sangdo
strategy team was shocked when, during a meeting, he witnessed two (non-family)
subsidiary CEOs refuse a directive by the Sangdo chairman to institute a new
production system in their factories on account of it threatening their revenues.
To Baik, it signalled that the subsidiary CEOs held the real ‘power’ within the
conglomerate as they were not afraid to speak up to the chairman. He eventually
transferred to one of the subsidiaries where he would work more on the front lines
of international sales. Similarly, junior employee Mina was hired out of a top
university to boost early-career women in the conglomerate; after a few years,
the third-generation owner personally helped her transfer to a new marketing
position in a subsidiary. She soon became disillusioned when the subsidiary
showed no interest in marketing or advertising, and where there were no female
workers outside of secretarial workers. She eventually left Sangdo completely to
restart her career in a different field. In this vein, the ethnographic tension I
describe in this article emerges in the gap between the promise of working with
corporate owners and the disillusionment around the limits of ownership power in
the organization. The vicissitudes of personalities, organizational politics and
workplace cultures revealed that ownership was not as powerful as some had
thought.
Chaebol or conglomerate families are a perennial topic of public news and
criticism, particularly over the misuse of elite privilege, ranging from topics of
nepotism and slush fund spending to political interference and ‘power-abuse’
(gapjil). For some, these kinds of incidents bring shame to South Korea’s (lack
of) economic development and occasionally prompt calls to sever chaebol families
completely from conglomerates themselves. Critical coverage however elides the
degree to which regular employment positions at chaebol organizations are still
widely desired among the middle classes. This is because corporate positions are
not just valued for their economic benefits alone; they convey a host of diacritics of
social and economic mobility, like working in a strategy department, in Seoul, on a
top floor, while speaking English, with good benefits, etc. The offices where mem-
bers of the family usually work as executives or chairmen, once known as ‘secre-
tariats’ (biseosil), play into these prestige categories as well. Secretariats, today
existing in the form of holding companies or large strategy offices, represent a
twin apex in this sociocultural-corporate hierarchy: such offices are usually ‘above’
other subsidiaries and units in a conglomerate, such that they manage or control
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others; and they are also most physically proximate to those with many forms of
social distinction themselves, owner-executives. They are also the most difficult
sites for both the public and even internal actors to access, adding to their appeal
and mystique.
My initial goal during fieldwork in Seoul across 2013 and 2015 had been to
avoid such high-powered contexts. I was interested in more generic white-collar
office relations among teams amidst changing technologies of communication.
This was deliberate, aiming to move away from the outsized attention that
owning families (and the chaebol phenomenon) receive in studies of South
Korean political economy. However, despite efforts to make connections with
corporations purely through interviews and networking, my only invitation to
conduct longer-term fieldwork inside a company came via an owner-executive
family member at Sangdo who shared an American alumni connection. This
was a double-edged sword, as I found an ideal site for fieldwork but one placed
precisely within the complex world of the holding company. My desk as an intern
on the HR team was located just down the hall from the third-generation owner-
executive’s office and surrounded by managers and employees who had survived
many years in Seoul’s corporate world. Elsewhere, I have focused on generic
aspects of the Sangdo workplace, highlighting workplace conflicts while minimiz-
ing mention of the ownership (e.g. Prentice, 2019). This was deliberate, in order to
not locate ownership influence or authority as the ultimate source of control. By
not directly addressing the ownership, I was attempting to write about office-place
issues that they might find relevant as readers, as a sort of indirect return-gift for
allowing me to work at Sangdo for one year.
In this context, my analysis here focuses not on what kind of power family
ownership actually possessed, but rather what kind of power they were seen to
have. Seen from the perspective of the average person, conglomerate-owning fam-
ilies are certainly powerful. However, seen from the perspective of other employees
or managers (who also have some forms of distinction and workplace power of
their own), the power of conglomerate-owning family members was of a different
quality: it was premised on their abilities to effect things within the organization in
the ways others could not. This is similar to Alfred Gell’s notion of a magic-
standard which he defined as ‘a means of securing a product without the work-
cost that it actually entails’ (Gell, 1992: 58). In South Korean popular culture, for
instance, a chairman is often depicted as having the power to execute major deci-
sions through a single phone-call. In real life office culture, the aura of dynastic
ownership in South Korea can make ownership appear super-organizational, with
the ability to carry out sweeping new projects while pushing through intra-office
politics. I suggest however, that close encounters can reveal the limits of such
images: the Sangdo owner-executives were involved in many aspects of conglom-
erate management, however this made them more entangled in office-level issues,
not less. High-level managers, in turn, also became involved in the other aspects of
ownership activity beyond corporate change. In making this case, I am combating
the tendency to ‘sociologize’ the corporate elite as powerful by recourse to their
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positions in set societal, organizational or wealth hierarchies. As I discuss, many of
their powers to attract elite employees into the company did not necessarily trans-
late into sweeping organizational change; in fact, it revealed how entangled own-
ership was in organizational life and politics. Ultimately, this kind of ethnographic
account – one that attempts to convey the perspective of the powerful from the
perspective of those who work with them – allows us to see the putatively powerful
otherwise.6
Encountering aura in the Sangdo tower
Inside the 40-storey Sangdo corporate tower, the only areas open to visitors were the
cafe, museum and auditorium. The museum was essentially a small exhibition area
displaying different artifacts of Sangdo’s history: a global map of its offices, pictures
of workers, different samples of key Sangdo industrial products, and an enlarged
graph showing the group’s up-and-up revenue growth over the past half-century.
Some graphics overlaid the group’s success onto the nation’s, describing Sangdo’s
success as the ‘cornerstone of national economic development’, a common narrative
among large industrial groups. Interspersed among the company artifacts were
images of the founder and a previous chairman, father and son. Personal, family
pictures were arranged in a photo collage on one side of the museum. Inspirational
messages and artful portraits of the two men hung from banners. The tower’s cafe
itself had a recreated bookshelf featuring the founder and previous chairmen’s col-
lection of business books in Korean and English. In spaces reserved for employees,
private possessions from the owning family were also on display. Lining the walls of
an upper floor, only visible to employees or authorized visitors, were large works of
modern art alongside sculptures, vases and other decorative objects. And in meeting
rooms and employee areas in subsidiaries throughout the Sangdo tower were paint-
ings and sculptures from the family’s art collection.
Such spaces and artifacts contributed to the aura around the owning family as
not only central to the founding and corporate culture of Sangdo, but one with
extra-economic value and sentiment. The words of the current chairmen, for exam-
ple, were regularly featured in the company magazine, urging employees to do
their best while confronting economic challenges. The chairman was also the
source of the annual variable bonus rate for employees. Such traces of a benevolent
elite were certainly part of an effort to confirm their symbolic positions in the
group by situating them as the heart and spirit of Sangdo, thus making them
inseparable from the organizational form (while also distancing themselves from
the more unseemly aspects of either their global capitalist production or domestic
labour politics; see also Sklair, 2018). At the same time, such artifacts were inter-
nally directed and addressed to Sangdo’s many thousands of employees. In this
sense, they were part of an appeal to the subjectivities of regular employees, who
were not just working at a ‘steel conglomerate’ but working under leaders with
historical legacy, who had grand visions for the future, and who exhibited
upper-class tastes in their personal lives. Part of the appeal of conglomerate
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family leaders, then, is the inclusion of others, however indirectly, within their
personal spheres. For most employees, this is a fictive claim – by virtue of their
contiguity at a Sangdo subsidiary or by working in the Sangdo tower, they could
partake of the chairman’s or owning family’s legacy. (Such social facts could be
referenced when, after a team-sponsored dinner, employees might jokingly thank
the absent chairman for buying the meal.)
Managers and employees in the Sangdo holding company below the chairman’s
floor at the top of the tower had more direct engagement with family executives.
They were responsible for managing, translating and protecting this aura both
inside and outside the group. For instance, members of the PR team fielded
press calls and managed news articles about both the group and the family.
Together with the PR team, the HR team helped to create a set of unique company
core values (haeksim gachi), that were based on the owning family’s own set of
unique values. These were converted into discrete sets of behaviours printed on
leaflets that employees were meant to learn and adopt in their daily tasks.
A separate investment team handled overseas investment projects on behalf of
the ownership’s financial capital. And a small general affairs team, which nomi-
nally took care of office administration tasks, also managed various personal
affairs for the ownership, such as keeping track of their real estate properties
and their art collection, as well as putting on personal events, discussed further
later. One junior employee in general affairs, who used to be an assistant for a film
star, largely served as a direct personal assistant to members of the family. While
there was an official CEO at the holding company, all the teams reported to the
chairman or third-generation executive.
The work of the holding company was not in the service of promoting the aura
of a specific person. Many of the teams (or departments) were either created or
expanded by a third-generation owner who had been promoted to a key executive
position with plans to change the internal management structure and external
image of Sangdo. That owner is part of the so-called ‘third generation’ (samse)
(and increasingly fourth generation) of conglomerate family owners in South
Korea who are the direct descendants of founders. Today these heirs, between
30 and 50 years old, have moved up through their groups along special paths
beginning with a lower-level position in order to gain experience and earn their
own reputation within the business (if they are involved in corporate life at all).
Their successes and failures at different stages (say, by leading a new overseas
venture) are keenly followed internally and in South Korean business media as
indicators of whether they have the leadership qualities to be picked to succeed as a
chairperson in the future (see Figure 1).
Though not themost seniormember of the holding company at the time, the third-
generation owner was personally involved in recruiting experienced managers and
executives fromoutside the company and interviewing new university graduates who
might start their careers there. Up until the 2010s, the holding company had had a
limitedmanagerial role in the SangdoGroup, existing largely as a financial reporting
vessel and office of the chairman.7 However, the third-generation owner led the
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expansion of teams (like HR, legal, strategy, performance, and PR) and the hiring of
experienced managers from other conglomerates or consulting firms. Each of the
teams was involved in taking on new managerial roles within the holding group,
which was generally referred to as ‘systematization’ (siseutemhwa). Though this
approach was never made explicit in any documents I came across, teams across
the holding company were in the process of developing new systems (or projects) of
reporting and creating shared standards under their respective departmental
domains that would integrate the largely separate and autonomous worlds of the
Sangdo subsidiaries.
Figure 1: A newspaper depiction of third- and fourth-generation conglomerate family members
who have recently become chairman at three conglomerate groups: LG, Hanjin and Doosan. The
graphic, titled ‘Generational shift in top leadership’’, elaborates (along the left axis) a comparison
of their key qualities including: their generation, their lineage, career titles and progression,
personal assets, and the number of companies they are in charge of.
Source: ‘Generational shift in top leadership getting real’, Yonhap News, 15 May 2019, https://
www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20190515069500002. Graphic reproduced with permission.
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This systematization was most evident in the redesign of the Sangdo brand.
With the hiring of new marketing managers in the PR department, the third-
generation executive had engineered a widescale rebranding effort, starting with
the Sangdo Group corporate identity. The executive oversaw the redesign of the
logo and brand look, as well as individual company websites, the conglomerate
magazine, and branded paraphernalia, like business card holders, office supplies,
and company pins. New templates were added to PowerPoint designs that featured
graphics of metal and fire, rather than the stolid corporate blues favoured by many
blue-chip manufacturing companies. Visual motifs were markedly fashionable and
demure – often all black, with black lettering or embossed symbols that did not call
immediate attention to themselves as corporate objects. Many of the items did not
even have the company name on them at all, signalling a nod to higher-end con-
sumer tastes, rather than company display. These design elements were parlayed
into sleek new brand promotional videos that played in elevators and on screen
displays. Professional photographs of the Sangdo tower and Sangdo’s many fac-
tories echoed the romantic mid-century industrial photography of Maurice
Broomfield. Likewise, the company magazine featured custom designed artwork
and snappy copy, with the help of an outsourced writing and graphics team.
Sangdo may not have been a household name in South Korea, but its redesigns
reflected an awareness of aesthetic distinctions. These also differentiated from
previous internal productions which focused on celebrating and documenting
employee culture, such as by featuring an employee on the cover of each magazine.
The branding efforts signalled an awareness of more recent Western business
trends that have moved away from defining and managing a specific ‘corporate
culture’ towards the more diffuse idea of values and qualities of lifestyle branding
(Krause-Jensen, 2011). While the branding projects did not overtly reference the
ownership and were carried out by many professional experts, employees could cite
them as products of the third-generation owner-executive’s new initiative.
In contrast to American workers who might want to empower themselves by
thinking like owners (Souleles, 2020), managers and other employees at the holding
company did not overly identify with either the culture of the owners or the cor-
porate brand in the ways that other employees were meant to (i.e., by fully living
by the company values). Part of the reason is that many had already been partially
socialized into elite worlds themselves (the holding company employees were gen-
erally recruited from elite Seoul universities or from other prestigious conglomer-
ates). Moreover, as subject-area experts with certifications in accounting or
consultant backgrounds, holding company managers might have seen themselves
more like socio-technical translators between the family and the group generally,
and the projects of the third-generation executive more specifically. Some of these
projects translated well without significant obstacles, such as the suite of branding
projects discussed above. Those were ostensibly successful in part because there
had been almost no branding or marketing within other subsidiaries to begin with.
Subsidiary employees I knew in the Sangdo tower appeared happy to have new
gifts for clients, new advertising and modern office decor that was subsidized in
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large part by the holding company. However, the ability to translate ownership
across the conglomerate was met with greater pushback in other departments and
areas where subsidiaries themselves claimed actual expertise, as I describe in the
next section.
An office of experts and experiments
One of the appeals for managers at the holding company was the ability to have a
wider scope of work and be considered as an expert leading the conglomerate in a
new direction, rather than a manager with a narrow remit focused on one subsid-
iary or task. Indeed, by virtue of the corporate structure, the holding company
technically owned Sangdo’s various subsidiaries, which were obligated to report to
the holding company departments on various issues, from quarterly performance
reports to annual strategic plans. However, because their remit was purely finan-
cial and a seeming test-case for the third-generation executive, vertical connections
between any subsidiary and the holding company were otherwise relatively thin.
Many subsidiaries had their own systems, made their own investments, and culti-
vated their own workplace cultures distinct from each other. In certain cases, they
could refuse orders to cooperate or at least not participate in group-level projects.
For the holding company, then, developing new projects that would sweep across
the internal structure of the conglomerate proved a dense thicket. In fact, the
experts in the holding company often ended up acting upon themselves as much
as other subsidiaries.
When I went to lunch one day with manager Kwon from the strategy team, I
asked him what he thought about a new HR programme in the holding company
called DRIVE (a pseudonym for a new work-tracking system). Kwon scoffed
slightly at the question, noting that everything the HR team was doing was just
an ‘experiment’ (silheom) that was being tested in the holding company. Indeed,
DRIVE was a radical new programme, meant to transform how workers recorded
their tasks and how they would be evaluated for them. It was being launched first
in the holding company with the assumption that upon its success, it would be
disseminated to the subsidiaries.
Though not directly created by the third-generation owner-executive, DRIVE
was a plan that was linked to the third-generation owner’s desire to create more
opportunities for individual merit and rewards; to that end, a more ‘accurate’
work-tracking system would be needed. The system was developed by the new
experts brought in to make HR more like a consulting group premised on effecting
corporate change than a personnel management group. In the year I was with the
team, which had been expanded to eight members from three a few years prior to
my arrival, they launched new projects that targeted benefits, executive pay, pro-
motion, employee engagement, internal training and education, and labour statis-
tics, among other projects. However, many of these projects were limited in scope
to collecting data, recommending shared standards and working on the outskirts
of HR management, such as recruiting or executive evaluation. They had little
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remit to impose changes onto individual HR departments themselves. As a result,
some of the projects had to be pilot-tested on the holding company staff before
they could be shared with subsidiaries.
DRIVE was a significant project that involved reimagining how workers
thought of their tasks, how tasks would be recorded, and how team managers
would evaluate them. Created on an internal software system (ERP), it was
meant to minimize the gap between the recording of work and work itself, not
unlike how financial numbers and inventory are closely tracked (see Chong, 2018).
The HR managers saw this as a more modern development, achieving a certain
kind of managerial ideology of a one-to-one fit between work and documentation.
In reality, DRIVE involved a complicated set of rules, buttons, procedures and
terms, that represented how HR managers saw work (as individual projects that
could be broken down into separate tasks). Without going into the details of the
system, it is worth noting that DRIVE required a manual and training sessions for
both managers and employees to learn to use it. Even though it was meant to
clearly reflect manager–employee relations (in which employees do a project and
managers evaluate it), it actually added more tasks, checks and reports to monitor
– tasks which even other managers and employees in the holding company often
ignored as they saw them interfering with their own work.
While the DRIVE programme was being piloted within the holding company,
the HR team manager Jang began to share details of the programme with two of
the major Sangdo subsidiaries, Sangdo First and Sangdo South. In one presenta-
tion to Sangdo First, the team manager shared details about the new programme
with an executive, adopting an obsequiously respectful and cheerful demeanour as
he spoke glowingly of the new programme’s features, careful not to insult the
subsidiary’s existing evaluation programme. The executive, who had not worked
in HR, gave it a lukewarm reception. Later, Jang told me that the purpose was not
to try to sell him on it at that time, but to get them to implement it over time,
perhaps after other subsidiaries. Sangdo South, on the other hand, was more
receptive to DRIVE but decided to implement its own version of the programme.
It was not a direct copy but was renamed and adapted to their organization. Jang
acknowledged later that by letting them adapt it, it would not be seen as the
holding company forcing it upon them directly.
The DRIVE programme was still being tweaked by the time I departed in 2015.
However, the friction encountered in its implementation revealed how difficult it
was simply to implement a radically different evaluation system of office work
onto both themselves and subsidiaries, especially one that would be tied to indi-
vidual evaluations, promotion trajectories and bonuses. Where the HR workers
might have had the benefit of knowing the third-generation owner supported the
project, they were otherwise exposed as insider-strangers, subject to those who
personally outranked them, but in subordinate companies. (Jang described this
to me once as the holding company being in a ‘step-mother’ role.) In reality, for all
its new conceptualizations around the recording of work, DRIVE was rather basic
as a technology, created through a simple ERP application with in-house IT
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workers. In contrast, the large subsidiaries that were seen to be in need of mod-
ernization, actually had their own professional human resources management sys-
tems (HRMS) purchased from large IT companies like Microsoft or SAP, which
had cost millions of dollars to implement and which tracked thousands of
employees.
In the year after I left Sangdo, team manager Jang and another manager in HR
were transferred from the holding company to lead the HR department at one of
the large subsidiaries. At the subsidiary, they would directly oversee an organiza-
tion of thousands of employees and, in theory, have a greater impact through the
programmes they managed. While the exact reason for their transfer was difficult
to ascertain, I suspected it was to be closer to an actual organ of organizational
power and away from the politics of the holding company where they would
always be in an ‘experimenting’ role, competing with other experts who were
also doing the same thing. At a subsidiary, they would also be physically farther
from the everyday realities of the owners-executives’ lives which also crept into
their managerial work.
Dynastic realities
One day during my fieldwork, all employees received a somewhat neutral memo
via the company intranet about appropriate office conduct and dress. The list of
bullet points included general reminders on when men had to wear ties, when they
could don short sleeves, and how they should present in meetings with clients or
suppliers. One peculiarity of the memo was a note saying that employees should
not wear their Sangdo company jackets in public. This was peculiar precisely
because the jackets had been supplied by the company. The Sangdo jackets,
unlike more conventional Korean company jackets which are typically rather
bulky canvas bomber jackets adorned with large company logos, were actually
stylish, at least in comparison. Everyone in the tower was given one for free, men
and women, and employees voluntarily wore them over their business attire in and
out of the office from the fall to spring.
The jackets had been the creation and promotion of the third-generation family
owner-executive as part of the branding efforts. The moratorium on wearing the
cold-weather jacket outside was a surprise to me, but not to my teammate in HR,
Ki-ho, a junior employee whose desk was adjacent to mine. Despite the memo
being anonymous, he knew from experience that the directive came from a second-
generation owner in a different executive position. Explaining this fact to me in a
hushed whisper, he pointed to the ceiling to indicate it came from above on the
chairman’s floor. Ki-ho had a hunch that this particular owner-executive did not
like the look of employees wearing puffer jackets over their business formal wear.
By pointing upwards, he was also implying that it was a dispute among family
members that employees best not make mention of.
Ki-ho was familiar with this particular owner because they would often walk
through the office doing impromptu visual checks on employee desk areas. When
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their voice could be heard coming down a hallway, employees might straighten
documents, clear desks, and hide extra pairs of shoes under their desks. The owner
would visually inspect desks for personal items out of place, dust gathering on tops
of computers, and documents not stacked properly or in too great a quantity. A
co-worker who had worked in other companies admitted that he had never worked
at an office with such ‘clean’ (paper-free) desks before. The loose handling of
documents and visually shabby presentations (even as an index of intensive
work) in the office were taken to be signs of disregard not just for the company,
but seemingly for that owner’s space.
Other personal tastes and styles of the owners were integrated into company life
but in ways that did not necessarily align with new managerial projects. For
instance, the owning family was a patron of classical music.8 Western classical
music has long been associated with modern taste and class distinctions in
South Korea (Harkness, 2012). The owners were on the board of a national clas-
sical music society and sponsored classical music events at the national music
centre. One member of the family put on quarterly lectures in the corporate
tower on classical music topics, lectures taken to regional offices as well. These
lectures were widely advertised to all the employees of every subsidiary, and youn-
ger employees dutifully attended to fill seats in the Sangdo auditorium. The three
lectures I attended during my time at the company as an employee involved videos
of Western musical pieces with occasional performances by South Korean musi-
cians. Employees in attendance, most of whom were young and male, would listen
diligently, but no one ever seemed to be particularly interested in the content of the
lectures. The lectures were seen as events that were good to do as a matter of
corporate duty. This is not to say that employees were not interested in elite
activities; however, most young male employees would have been more interested
in conventional middle-class consumer activities like travel and fashion, not the
erudite European tastes of the ownership. (And most upper-level managers seemed
to find legitimate excuses not to attend the lectures.)
Some events brought employees into the fold of the owners’ social circles more
intimately. As mentioned, I shared an American alumni connection with one of the
owners. On one occasion, I found myself in attendance at the same event at a fancy
hotel in downtown Seoul (one of the few points of mutuality between us).
However, going as an ‘American PhD student’ from the university, not a corporate
employee, I was surprised to find co-workers from the Sangdo PR and general
affairs team manning the registration table. This included some junior employees
who might be expected to lend a hand at such events, but I also saw a few more
senior managers who were in charge of registering alumni into the event. Taken
aback by the fact that I knew the employees, I attempted to play both roles to
minimize the fact that our roles were temporarily reversed. At a similar occasion, a
family-sponsored event at a large concert hall in Seoul, I saw employees from the
IT subsidiary deputized to help. Such workers, who had degrees in computer sci-
ence, were working as ushers and ticket-takers, appearing as unmarked employees
of the event hall, not even Sangdo employees. Both of these events (alumni meeting
260 Critique of Anthropology 41(3)
and concert) were in the service of the owners’ own positions within their elite
social circles, not in the direct service of corporate philanthropy or PR.
Dynastic auras and corporate life are of course interwoven, but it is worth
noting a distinction between working for an owning family as an organizational
agent versus working for an owning family on things that might be irrelevant or
even counter to organizational needs. This distinction could be evident with activ-
ities that were overtly personal, but with projects that blurred the line between a
personal (pet) project and an organizationally relevant one. For instance, while
working, I was asked by one owner-executive to help update the English trans-
lations of Korean job titles across the entire conglomerate. This was technically an
HR task and involved systematization across subsidiaries, but it was also a project
emerging from the minor concerns of one owner-executive having to do with the
outward look of Sangdo business cards in encounters with foreign businesspeople
(quite rare for many office functions). Nevertheless, for my final month at Sangdo
I worked on developing a new unified system of English titles. Translating all the
possible titles turned out to be not so much a linguistic problem as a political one.
Altering titles in English, especially for executives who each had particular titles
(such as ‘vice chairman’ or ‘senior executive’) meant potentially encroaching on the
relationships with other subsidiaries. Team manager Jang, sensing the complicated
politics of even this simple translation request, took over my work and developed a
final report that threaded the needle between answering the owner-executive’s
requests for a unified system, while being conscious of the titles for each of the
executives in the subsidiaries.
Being deputized for certain kinds of unexpected tasks is not uncommon in white-
collar offices in SouthKorea, where job descriptions can be very general and oneway
of blending in is to sacrifice one’s personal time in order to earn one’s keep.
Presumably such sacrifices lead to recognition, inclusion or personal favours later
on.At times in the holding company, executives,managers, or even junior employees
could spontaneously be called down to lunch or dinner with a member of the own-
ership. In one instance, I was abruptly called down to a fancy Italian restaurant near
the company building and was encouraged to drink wine at lunch, while one owner
regaled us with personal stories. It seemed that one or two of the managers at the
lunch were somewhat regular invitees; and it was quite strange to see them outside of
their normal ‘expert’ zone, subordinate and attentive to the owner. While the stakes
were relatively low for me as an outside observer, I imagined that it was riskier for
othermanagers and executives to refuse or say the wrong thing, which could portend
anegative outcome at some future promotionmeeting.As an employee, I had learned
not to ask too directly about opinions of the owners – for fear that it might be over-
heard or that it would put employees in a difficult position.
While the aura of being part of a ‘new generation’ of Sangdo leadership was
powerful, at least in terms of hiring narratives and exposure to elite worlds rarely
seen by conventional office workers, the intertwining of familial and work activ-
ities created a complex topography for employees in the holding company to nav-
igate. This is not simply to reaffirm a point I wrote of at the beginning of this
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article, that familial and professional activities are inherently ill-fitting. Rather, it
suggests that there is a gap between the aura or mystique of a generational shift in
an abstract, promissory sense (at Sangdo, in South Korea) and the realities of
working closely with real persons, whose personal lives are also complexly inter-
twined with the organizational form and organizational politics. There were occa-
sional breaches that reified ‘familial’ and ‘professional’ differences, as well as
covert intra-familial conflicts, but equally importantly, I would suggest, the
work of socio-technical translation of the owning family’s will to a (new) organi-
zational reality was much more difficult than newly hired managers assumed.
Conclusion
This article has explored how expert managers came to interact with elite owners
who had claims to a dynastic corporate lineage in South Korea. I have argued that
part of what makes working near owner-executives appealing is the idea that they
have super-organizational abilities to influence or control a large conglomerate
based on their dynastic legacies and the narratives surrounding new generational
leadership. I have shown that, for many managers, the aura that inspired them to
join Sangdo’s growing holding company – to be part of the centralization and
systematization of Sangdo – wore off as they confronted owner personalities,
personal projects, and the stickier realities of organizational politics.
What is hidden from public view is often prefigured as something possessing
what Grey and Costas (2016: 56) have described as an organization’s ‘mysterium’,
which can ‘stimulate a certain excitement and aura’. In the context of South
Korean conglomerates, we might imagine that the truly powerful sit on the top
floor or behind closed doors where they wield their exclusive power. Employees I
met from other subsidiaries or conglomerates suspected I would be doing some
sort of expose on the ‘secrets’ of the Sangdo owning family by virtue of my prox-
imity. Even I at times wondered whether I would encounter the font of corporate
secrets in an executive’s office or written on a document somewhere, an organiza-
tional version of ‘ethnographic seduction’ (Osburg, 2013; Robben, 1996).
However, as I have described in this article, what is most often found behind
closed doors is not corporate power laid bare, but the lifestyles and personalities
of the wealthy. These are distinct from corporate life, but interwoven in many
aspects of it, from class-cultural events to administrative projects.
Aura can animate certain kinds of actors as more agentive (that is, powerful) the
further we are from them. This bears importance for the future of studying up.
In Laura Nader’s seminal account, studying up reflected studying powerful insti-
tutions such as insurance and banking, because ‘such institutions and their network
systems affect our lives and also affect the lives of people that anthropologists have
traditionally studied all around the world’ (Nader, 1972: 293). However, her
account also slips into notions of ‘up’ meaning the study of elite and powerful
people. Nader notes: ‘the powerful are out of reach on a number of different
planes: they don’t want to be studied; it is dangerous to study the powerful;
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they are busy people; they are not all in one place, and so on’ (1972: 18). This has
importance for how anthropologists, in seeking to study power, may conflate a
lack of access to powerful institutions with the study of powerful persons, even
attributing such lack of access to their powers.9 To understand entities like South
Korean conglomerates, it is certainly necessary to include a study of owners, but it
is equally important to study how ownership power (or corporate power in gen-
eral) is projected or imagined ethnographically.
While it may be axiomatic for anthropologists concerned with power to be
oriented towards critiquing it (see Ortner, 2016), it is worth highlighting in closing
that certain kinds of power relations are also sources for establishing social rela-
tions, particularly within complex or competitive labour economies. For instance,
hierarchical working relationships in South Korea, even when structured by cer-
tain kinds of interpersonal asymmetries, are premised on exchanges of sacrifice and
reward over one’s career (such as a boss who might reward a subordinate for
working long hours on their behalf). The issue is not that one is in a power relation
at all, but whether one’s connections are good ones or not. That is, whether one’s
sacrifices for one boss or line will pay off in the future – such as junior employees
who might aspire to be like the managers, executives or owners they work for. For
the upper-level managers at Sangdo who worked under owner-executives, they
found themselves in a putatively powerful line as experts within the holding com-
pany. Such proximity promised greater organizational power and their own chance
to cut through the complications of South Korean corporate life, one way of
escaping the complications of capitalism albeit from inside(cf. Miyazaki, 2006:
151); however, for many, such connections only entangled them further within it.
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Notes
1. Others have looked at the changing nature of stock ownership, corporate structures, and
community or employee stock-owned firms (see Welker and Wood, 2011; Maurer and
Martin, 2012; and Souleles, 2020 respectively).
2. Janelli and Yim’s (1993) ethnography remains one of the most thorough anthropological
accounts linking patterns across social life (family, school, village, military, politics) with
new organizational structures and norms. While outside the topics discussed in this
article, the most relevant discussions of dynastic legacies and corporate states in the
Koreas have been come from anthropological analyses of North Korea’s political dynas-
ty. Kwon and Chung (2012: 188) describe the Kims’ legacy as one built around institu-
tionalized ‘hereditary charisma’, a mechanism to overcome the problem of ‘perpetual
charisma’ over time. Ryang (2012) notes that North Korea is unique because the issue is
not one of succession, but the enshrinement of Kim Il-sung as an object of love with
which citizens can identify. For critical discussion, see Song (2013). It is evident that
corporate dynasties in South Korea and elsewhere rely on a mix of both founder hagi-
ography and the integration of descendants into the managerial structure (not unlike the
Ford Motor Company).
3. Chaebol, a neutral term in English, but a term of criticism when used in South Korea
where the more generic terms ‘large corporation’ (daegieop) or ‘group companies’ (geur-
upsa) are used, have long caused categorical trouble for economists. See for instance Oh
and Park (2001). One basic issue is that the actual number of ‘chaebol’ is hard to assess,
as there are both non-family conglomerates and family-owned companies that are not
conglomerates.
4. There are of course other socio-cultural aspects of kinship relevant to the South Korean
office, such as fictive siblingship among co-workers, norms around the nuclear family
(Jo, 2004), the use of extended kin networks in the early days of industrialization (Chang,
1999), and intimate relations among owning families. My particular focus here is on
dynastic legacies and the relationship to management.
5. Benjamin’s(2007 [1968]) account of ‘aura’ is the most canonical, if problematic. He
defined it as the ‘unique presence’ or ‘authenticity’ of a work of art but one that ‘withered
in the age of mechanical reproduction’ (2007 [1968]: 221). Conceptually, my usage here
comes closest to Simmel’s notion of an ‘ideal sphere’ (cited in Goffman, 1956: 481) and
Nancy Munn’s concept of ‘fame’ as ‘being the potential for influence on the acts of a third
party other’ (Munn, 1986: 117, emphasis in original). In contrast to Benjamin’s notion,
aura (or fame) is not diminished through reproduction, but in fact enhanced via circu-
lation, much like individual celebrity or genius in the West (see Mialet, 2012)
6. This point meshes with historian Carter Eckert’s broad account of South Korean capitalists
in the 20th century: ‘South Korea’s capitalist elite have been forced to live and operate in
an ethical world that is not of their own making’ (1990: 144) reflecting the fact that for all
their economic concentration and privilege, critical citizens and government regulators
alike have prevented capitalists from establishing broader hegemonic status.
7. In 2000, the South Korean government began a campaign to get large conglomerates to
form holding companies (jijuhoesa) as a matter of financial transparency and governance,
in part stemming from the financial crisis of 1997–8 and in part stemming from criticism
of the complicated cross-holdings of the conglomerates, known as ‘circular shareholding’
which obscured both capitalization and control within the conglomerates. Ironically, the
holding company form had been banned in the 1980s for largely the same reasons.
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8. The genre of music would itself be indicative of their identity, so I focus on classical
music in generic terms.
9. The very definition of ‘elite’ put forth in The Anthropology of Elites conflates elements of
status (as a combination of socially recognized diacritics) and power (as authority over
others): ‘an elite is a relatively small group within the societal hierarchy that claims and/
or is accorded power, prestige, or command over others on the basis of a number of
publicly recognized criteria, and aims to preserve and entrench its status thus acquired’
(Salverda and Abbink, 2012: 1).
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